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Des « portes des océans » à une débâcle maritime : mer, colonisation écossaise et
projet du Darien, 1696-1700
Sophie Jorrand
Sept. 10. — This morning wee passed the Tropick of Cancer with a fresh and fair
gale, the ships performed the usual ceremony of ducking several of the Ships Crew,
who had not passed before; they were hoisted to the main yard arm, and let down
3 several times with a soss into the sea out over head and ears, their legs being tyed
somewhat closs, which was pretty good sport. (Rose, “Journal”, p. 192)1
We weighed and were under the sign of Cancer by the 10th of the month, at which
time the usual ceremony of ducking from the Yards arm was performed on those
that could not pay their tropick bottle. (“A Journal Kept from Scotland by One of
the Company”, 28 September 1698, p. 72)
1 The men who wrote these journals were embarking on an exciting venture, leaving
from Scotland to found the first-ever Scottish colony in Central America, right under
the nose of the Spaniards, in a place they believed the best one for world commerce.
This they were doing in spite of the joint opposition of the East India Company, which
feared  a  challenge  to  its  monopoly,  the  London  Parliament,  which  shared  their
anxieties, and King William III, who was afraid of a quarrel with Spain and concentrated
on European wars. They were sailing in ships which they had had to buy in Europe for
want of a suitable shipyard in Scotland itself. They also hoped for the help of the Darien
Indians,  and especially  their  non–existent  emperor.  And they flew the  Company of
Scotland’s flag: a sun rising over a wide expanse of sea-blue calm water. The tone in
their  journals  was  optimistic,  even  cheerful.  Much  was  expected  from  the  Darien
Venture.
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2 The Darien Scheme appears as Scotland’s greatest attempt at colonial expansion in its
own right, as a still  relatively independent country and nation. This project,  one of
several by the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, raised the highest
of patriotic and economic hopes, only to end in cataclysmic failure. At the instigation of
its promoter, William Paterson, this venture was intended to link the Atlantic and the
Pacific spaces and concentrated on the Isthmus of Darien, seen as the key to these wide
oceanic expanses.
3 William Paterson’s conception of what the colony of Caledonia should have been will be
looked into, and we shall also, mostly but not exclusively, draw upon journals by the
first expedition’s eye-witnesses, such as those by Hugh Rose or Captain Pennicook, as
well as another, anonymous diarist. Captain Pennicook, sometimes spelt Pennycook or
Pennicuik, was captain of the Saint Andrew and commodore of the Company’s fleet, and
Rose was the secretary of the Council of the Colony. Their journals sometimes replicate
each other, being sometimes identical, and may show interpolations, especially in the
passages about the Darien Indians—though they are different enough at times to be
judged of joint interest—for instance, Pennicook mentions desertions, unlike Rose.
4 After  a  brief  outline  of  the  context,  we  shall  try  and assess  what  the  Company of
Scotland’s project meant, or could have meant, in geostrategic terms of maritime space
and world trade. We shall  then study the close interrelation of sea and land in the
colonial project of Caledonia, in both its positive and negative manifestations, ranging
from  the  choice  of  a  good  harbour  as  a  future  base  and  the  establishment  of  the
seedling colony on a peninsula, in close proximity to the sea, to the in-between (“entre-
deux”), whether  it  be  made  manifest  through  mangroves,  rainy  weather,  or  even
amphibious attacks. The ambivalence of the sea, symbolically linked to both life and
death,  is  a  well-known theme,  but it  seems particularly relevant in the case of  the
Darien Scheme, and the last part of this paper shall  therefore study the conflicting
presentations  of  the  sea  that  appear,  often  simultaneously  or  nearly so,  in
contemporary accounts of the Darien experience.
 
A study in context: a strong tradition of emigration,
and a late start at colonization
5 Portugal and Spain had launched themselves into colonial expansion in and then across
the Atlantic space towards the Americas by the end of the 15th century, soon followed
by  France,  England  and  the  Low  Countries  in  what  Chaunu  has  termed  an  un-
partitioning of the worlds (“décloisonnement des mondes”; translation ours). This led Sir
William Alexander to declare, in 1624, in his Encouragement to Colonies in relation to the
Nova Scotia attempt: “my countriemen would never adventure in such an Enterprise,
unlesse it were as there was a New France, a New Spaine, and a New England, that they
might likewise have a New Scotland” (1624, p. 32). Scotland was handicapped by several
factors: its comparative small size, its poverty, and its minority status in the Union of
Crowns (an “anomalous position” analysed by Devine, 2003, p. 3).
6 A  long  tradition  of  maritime  connection  and  immigration,  whether  scholarly,
mercantile,  or soldierly,  with Northern Europe especially,  had been well-established
from  the  Middle  Ages.  This  included  the  Hanseatic  cities,  Poland,  Denmark,
Scandinavia, and France, not forgetting the Ulster of the 17th century (Devine, 2003,
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pp. 8–17,  and  pp. 20–4).  Thriving  Scottish  communities  existed  all  over  Northern
Europe (Devine, 2003, pp. 9–12). Scotsmen also played a part in colonizing Northern
America,  sometimes  in  the  English  colonies  established  there,  despite  a  strong
preference for the more ancient European connections (Landsman, 1999, pp. 463, 465).
However, there had also been several attempts at Scottish settlements: Nova Scotia,
sacrificed by London on the altar of good diplomatic relationships with France; Cape
Breton,  attacked by the  French;  East  New Jersey,  before  its  absorption in  the  royal
colony of New Jersey; and Stuart’s Town in Carolina, attacked by the Spaniards in 1686
(Insh, 2004; Devine, 2003, pp. 38–9). The Americas were a place to emigrate for those
freely seeking a better life, but also a place to transport political opponents during the
Commonwealth (Armitage, 1997, p. 46).
7 Traditional European markets were shrinking in the second half of the 17th century,
for example France, following Colbert’s protectionist measures, and these deteriorating
trading conditions could not counterbalance agricultural problems at home: poor lands
and  cold,  wet  climate  accounted  for  poor  crops  in  some  decades  and  made  not
starvation but dearth loom large (Devine, 2003, p. 15). By the 1680s and 1690s, neither
the existing sea connections nor the land seemed to provide satisfactory opportunities;
the time had come to try and go further,  and embark on transatlantic  ventures.  It
seemed vital  to  resort  once  more  to  the  sea,  and  exploit  the  country’s  peninsular
situation,  relocating  the  centres  of  decision-making,  and  looking  to  an  Atlantic
seaboard. Several English Navigation Acts had repeatedly stood in the way of Scottish
maritime  development  (Devine,  2003,  pp. 31–2),  and  as  a  direct  result,  pre-Union
Scotland did not enjoy free trade with either England or its colonies, and neither did it
enjoy independence at sea. By the 1690s, Scotland had but few ships at its disposal and
even fewer maritime opportunities. But it also had this deeply ingrained tradition of
emigration,  and an Atlantic  seaboard.  Included within the  sovereign powers  of  the
Company of Scotland was, revealingly, the power “to Equipp, Fit, Set out, Fraught and
Navigat their own, or hired Ships, in such manner as they shall think fit […]” in the
“Act of Parliament Constituting the Company of Scotland, Trading to Africa and the
Indies” of 26 June 1695 (Hart, 1929, p. 185).
8 The said ships,  on which the hopes of  a  nation rested,  were not Scottish-built,  but
bought elsewhere, from Amsterdam or Hamburg. In other words, commerce gave rise
to  the  Company’s  first  fleet,  and  not  the  reverse.  After  loading  the  cargoes  and
victualling  the  ships,  they  set  sail  from  Leith  in  a  climate  of  high  expectation,
exhilaration and enthusiasm.
 
The Scottish Indies and the “Door of the Seas”: an
ambitious rewriting of late 17th century-Geostrategy
in Darien
9 There  were  in  fact  not  one  but  two  Darien  Schemes.  The  first,  joint-stock  project
funded  by  English  and  Scottish  capital  planned  to  follow  the  model prescribed  in
“Trading to Africa and the Indies”. It  contained no direct mention of the Americas,
though the Indies could be understood as the West Indies as well as the East Indies. Its
intended scope was as ambitious as that of other commercial companies, and it aimed
more  specifically  towards  Africa  and  the  East  Indies,  and  consequently  the
Indianoceanic space—which triggered the fears and reaction of the East India Company,
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as “Some Considerations upon the Late Act of the Parliament of Scotland” or “Some
Remedies to Prevent the Mischiefs from the Late Act of Parliament Made in Scotland, in
Relation to the East-India Trade” tend to show, as well as the reaction of the English
Parliament forbidding the joint-venture. Revealingly, no mention of America is made in
these pamphlets, and they are still classified in the Indian and African Studies Section
of  the  British  Library  of  London,  category  “East  India  Tracts”  (former  India  Office
Library).
10 In  contrast,  the  second  Darien  Scheme  was  an  exclusively  Scottish  project,  solely
funded by Scottish capital.  Investors thronged at Mrs Purdie’s coffee-house to enter
their names in the subscription book, wishing as much to defend national pride as to
invest in a promisingly prosperous venture. William Paterson, a Scottish merchant who
had lived in the Caribbean and London—he was one of the founders of the Bank of
England—played a crucial part in reorienting the new Darien Scheme towards Central
America. He well knew from personal experience of the opportunities the West Indies
had to offer; not only in relation to the Atlantic space, but also the “South Sea”, the
Pacific. Yet Paterson had never set foot on the isthmus itself, which may account, at
least partly, for his genuinely undaunted but purely theoretical enthusiasm about it.
The scope of this second, independent project was, in itself, enormous, since it aimed at
no less than bringing together the Atlantic and Pacific together, clearly breaking the
Spanish monopoly in the matter and challenging their long-established rights to the
area, by taking possession for Scotland of “these doors of what the Spaniards used to
proudly call their king’s summer chambers, or, more properly speaking, the keys of the
Indies and doors of the world” (Paterson, 1701, p. 147). It was more ambitious and novel
than other chartered companies’ projects, as it meant substitute itself, peacefully or
otherwise, for the main and most ancient colonial power in this part of the world.
11 The  isthmus  was,  for  Spain,  the  crucial  point  of  the Carrera  de  Indias,  not  an  easy
pathway due to climate, vegetation and terrain, but the narrowest connecting “neck of
land” as it is often described, between South and North Sea. It was the shortest route,
though always difficult and even perilous to cross. Yet, the alternative was enough to
frighten even the most hardened sailors: the passage round Cape Horn, or through the
risky Straits of Magellan. Across this trans-isthmian trail,  from Panama towards the
Atlantic seaboard, trains of mules would carry overland the riches from Philippines and
the Far East, together with silver mined from the Potosi, in today’s Bolivia. Here, they
would assemble at Portobello—Nombre de Dios having been twice attacked by Drake,
and then abandoned by the Spaniards—and sail from there or Cartagena, in modern-
day Colombia (Tavernier, 1970, p. 102; Ward, 1993, pp. 29–66, 188–9). Paterson thought
very highly of Darien and took in, in one wide rhetorical sweep, the part played by sea
routes and the world interconnectedness which Scotland could now play its part in:
“[T]hese doors of the seas and the keys of the universe would of course be capable of
enabling their possessors to give laws to both oceans, and to become the arbitrators of
the commercial world.” (Paterson, 1701, p. 159)
12 His objective was commerce, as, for him, “the isthmus of America [was] not only the
natural centre of the west, but easily to be put in a state of being that of at least two-
thirds of the trade and treasure of both Indies” (ibid., p. 127). Accordingly, he wished to
create a world entrepot,  in keeping with a venture focused upon trade rather than
military  conquest  with  its  concomitant  atrocities,  which  he  did  not  condone  and
wished to avoid: in his own words, “without being liable to the fatigues, expenses, and
From “the Doors of the Seas” to a Watery Debacle: The Sea, Scottish Colonizat...
Études écossaises, 19 | 2017
4
dangers, or of contracting such guilt and blood, as Alexander and Cæsar” (ibid., p. 159).
The merchant or tradesman was the new hero of the age, far from the bloodthirsty
conquerors of the past, far from conquistadores themselves, implicitly. This outpost of
future  trade,  a  “Scottish  Amsterdam  of  the  Indies”  (Callagher,  2015:  “Amsterdam
écossaise des Indes”; translation ours), was to welcome strangers and foreigners provided
they intended to settle, thus making the settlement stronger and richer, and religious
toleration was to be its hallmark (“a general naturalization, liberty of conscience, and a
permission  trade”,  Paterson,  1701,  p. 154).  It  was  an  enterprise  set  apart  from  the 
leyenda negra, therefore, with its massacres of Indians and the cruel Inquisition, not to
mention  the  territorial  monopoly  jealously  enforced  by  Spain,  which  regarded
trespassers into their Darien and South Sea provinces, especially Protestant, English-
speaking ones, as downright pirates (Botella-Ordinas, 2010, p. 146; Schurz, 1922, p. 185).
13 However,  it  would seem a stumbling-block was already present in Paterson’s noble,
somewhat  idealistic  ambitions.  To  settle  a  colony  in  the  teeth  of  colonial  Spain,
especially in a place of such geostrategic significance, meant that it needed the capacity
to  resist  attack.  Here  appears  the  sharpest  of  contrasts  between  theory,  “an
international emporium without the costs of territorial empire” (Devine, 2003, p. 46),
and practice. In order to endure long enough to trade, the colony of Caledonia would
have to defend itself, and the recruitment of colonists accordingly took on a strong
military imperative, although the official language resorted to double meaning, and
demurely mentioned “Overseers” and “Planters” when “officers” and “soldiers” were
actually meant (Prebble, 1968, p. 99). Of course, it may be argued, Ancient Rome itself
had its peasant soldiers, but the conquered remembered the soldiers in them rather
than the peasants, and the viceroys of the Spanish New World did not underestimate
the threat. The terms “overseers” and “planters” apparently indicate landsmen rather
than seamen, which means that the Councillors had survival in mind. However, the
primary objective, once the settlement was effective, remained trade, and therefore sea
ventures.
 
Places in-between sea and land
14 The meeting of land and sea might in fortunate circumstances provide the colonists
with natural harbours, though it could just as easily present them with salt shallows
and hazards such as mangroves.  While the former are,  clearly enough, in favour of
human activities, the latter can be seen as obstacles to them.
15 In Modern, 16th to 18th-century Europe, a trading or colonizing venture started from
one land, and sought to reach another one, thanks to the sea as connector, and bond:
the supremacy of the maritime element in exotic ventures cannot be in doubt. In most
cases, traders or colonists from Europe aimed for another continent, whether America,
Africa  or  Asia,  where  they  would  establish  themselves  close  to  the  sea,  either  as
permanent settlers (Plymouth) or occupants in trading-posts (the Moluccas), on or near
the coast, or up a river (the Hooghly), in the hinterland. Unsurprisingly, the first areas
to have been colonized by Europeans in the Americas were the Caribbean Isles, the first
commodious landfalls they had met on their way.2
16 A harbour, whether already existing or to be created, as Caledonia was, brings into
contact both sea and land and allows commerce and interaction between colonizing
nation, colonists, and colonized, hence its central importance. Consequently, the search
From “the Doors of the Seas” to a Watery Debacle: The Sea, Scottish Colonizat...
Études écossaises, 19 | 2017
5
for the best possible harbour was the Scottish settlers’ starting point, bearing in mind
not only the necessary connection to be kept and developed with the outside world—
the whole point of their enterprise, after all—but also the defensive matters, too. It had
to be spacious enough to accommodate a flourishing traffic of boats and ships, quite
safe and sheltered from both natural elements and enemies, easy to access and easy to
defend.  They needed solid  ground rather  than marshland,  unsilted waterways with
fresh water  in  the vicinity,  and not  brackish water.  In  other  terms,  one had to  be
assured of land before venturing at sea.
17 The  site  of  the  future,  but  short-lived,  Caledonia  Harbour,  seemed  to  win  general
approval.  It  was  judged  “most  excellent”  by  the  anonymous  writer  of  “A Journal”
(4 November 1698, p. 74), which is echoed by Rose: “[wee went] in our boats to sound a
bay  about  4 miles  to  the  eastward  of  Golden Island,  and  found it  a  most  excellent
harbour”, and, perhaps counting his chickens before they were hatched, he calculated
it  would  easily  shelter  “1000  of  the  best  ships”  (3 November  1698,  pp. 197–8).  The
natural protection it afforded was good, Pennicook thought: “here you ly Landlockt
every way, that noe wind can possibly hurt you” (Pennicook, 3 November 1698, p. 82,
echoed in Rose, 3 November 1698, p. 198). And the anonymous diarist saw in all this the
hand of God, writing in a dutifully thankful tone: “We are certainly much bound to
Providence in this affair; for as we were searching for the place we were directed to, we
found this”, and he carries on, “and though the Privateers had been so often at Golden
Island,  and  though  English,  Dutch, and  French  had  been  all  over  this  Coast,  from
Portobelo to Cartagena, yet never one of them made the discovery; even the Spaniards
themselves never knew of this place” (“A Journal”, 4 November 1698, p. 76). Apart from
sounding over-optimistic, this is tantamount to denying Balboa knowledge of the area
of the very town he founded, Acla.
18 Another example of place where this “entre-deux” is manifest and offers shelter to
humans would be Captain Ambrosio’s dwelling, protected as it is from a surprise attack:
“It stands upon the banks of this river with about 10 or a dozen lesser houses about it.
Their houses are on the sea hand inaccessible in a manner, being so advantageously
situate that no stranger can come at them that way by reason of the numerous unseen
shoalds,  small  rocks,  and  banks.”  (Rose,  21 November  1698,  p. 207)  This  seems  not
unlike  modern-day  Kuna  dwellings,  as  a  majority  of  Kuna  communities—the
descendants of the Indians Wafer and the Scottish settlers met in Darien—now live on
small coralline islands away from fevers while going every day on the mainland to till
their fields (Severin, 2002, pp. 216–7; McKendrick, 2016, p. 99).
19 At first, a kind of balance appeared between the sea (dynamic) and the land (static), and
the would-be colonists laboured at both: “The people ashoare are imployed in making
of huts, clearing way, & c. and those on board in ordering their holds, overhauling their
rigging,  blocksails,  & c.”  (Rose,  11 November 1698,  p. 205)  The settlement had to be
made first, but could only hope to endure thanks to communications with the outside
world, through the coming of news, supplies, and at a later stage the development of
commerce. However, a fundamental imbalance was soon to be observed, with the liquid
element gradually taking over, preventing human activities or at least slowing them
down considerably, and making men and women sick from mosquito-induced fevers.
20 Mangroves, where sea and land meet in a tangled vegetation of entwined aerial roots,
were hostile to European activities, and the time had not yet come when they would be
considered as shrines of biodiversity to be protected. Marshlands were justly feared, as
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they brought fevers, although the part played by mosquitoes as vectors was not yet
known. Mr Rose described an unsuitable place in the following terms: “On the main and
all the bay round full of mangrow and swampy ground, which is very unwholesome.”
(Rose, 1 Nov. 1698, p. 196)
21 Wafer, trudging across Darien with an open wound in his knee, found the conditions
truly appalling in the rainy season, and left an apocalyptic account of his experience in
which water and earth seem no longer to exist as distinct entities: “But not long after
Sun-set,  it  fell  a  Raining, as  if  Heaven  and  Earth  would  meet; which  Storm  was
accompanied  with  horrid  Claps  of  Thunder,  and  such  flashes  of  Lightning,  of  a
Sulpherous smell,  that we were almost stifled in the open Air.” (Wafer,  1704,  p. 13;
emphasis  ours)  The New Edinburgh colonists  did not  arrive in the rainiest  months,
unlike Wafer, yet references to rain and poor weather conditions are recurrent in the
testimonies  of  Caledonia’s  early  days  (Rose,  12–15 November  1698,  pp. 205–6;
19 November, p. 206; 1 and 2 December, p. 210): “24. Much wind and rain. 25. Wind and
rain  as  above.  27. Very  much  rain  and  wind.  28. These  24 houres  ther  has  fallen  a
prodigious quantity of rain. 29. Much rain with fresh gales.” (24–29 November, p. 208)
Rain, thunder, and downpours again, in an endless litany: in what Kricher terms the
“neo-tropical” climate (1997), rivers overflow their banks, swamps encroach, and, as in
Wafer’s narrative, earth and water appear to merge. This other “in-between” was of
course  prejudicial  to  human  activities,  both  in  preventing  regular  work  (“which
hinders the work much”, Rose, 2 December 1698, p. 209) and in augmenting the number
of the sick. Those still lodging onboard the ships suffered less from the fevers. It seems
William Paterson and the  Company’s  Directors  had overlooked this  part  of  Wafer’s
experience.  After  all,  the  Spaniards  themselves  had never  actually  settled  the  area
around New Edinburgh, at least not for long.
22 Another potentially lethal admixture of sea and land is to be noticed in the Isthmus’s
long-favoured military strategy, that of amphibious operations. Given the absence of
roads  or  even  permanent  paths  wide  and  clear  enough  for  Europeans  to  circulate
unhampered, and the difficulty of travelling overland combined with the necessity of
attacking  settlements  on  land,  troops  had  to  be  shipped  to  a  landing-point  and
disembarked close to the place they wanted to attack. This was exactly what privateers
and  pirates  had  done  against  the  Spanish  cities  of  the  Isthmus:  Henry  Morgan
organized  a  whole  fleet  before  attacking  Panama  (Exquemelin,  1684,  Part III,  p. 3).
Ironically, this was also the strategy the Spaniards resorted to in order to drive the
Scots  from  Caledonia:  their  land  forces—Campmaster  Luis  Carrisoli’s  men,  or  the
garrison  at  Toubacanti—were  insufficient,  and  expeditionary  reinforcements,  from
Colonial  America  and  from  Spain  itself,  under  the  command  of  Don  Juan  Diaz  de
Pimienta and Don Pedro Fernandez de Navarrete  respectively,  were shipped to  the
nearby Golden Island, then disembarked, to drive the Darien colonists away. When the
Spanish troops arrived in the Spring of 1699, the settlement was already abandoned;
but, on the second occasion, in April 1700, New Edinburgh capitulated, and so ended
the “Scottish dream of empire” (Prebble, 2000; Storrs, 1999).
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The ambivalences of the sea: life and death, dearth
and plenty
Eaux en mouvement, la mer symbolise un état transitoire entre les possibles encore informels
et les réalités formelles, une situation d’ambivalence, qui est celle de l’incertitude, du doute,
de l’indécision et qui peut se conclure bien ou mal. De là vient que la mer est à la fois l’image
de la vie et celle de la mort. (Chevalier & Gheerbrant, 1982, p. 623)
23 The sea is a traditional mythological and literary theme, and, as a metaphor of human
experience, the whole drama of human experience from beginning to end, it seems to
sum up and illustrate the contradictions of the Darien project. Apart from the divide
and difference between seamen and landsmen in the Council of the Colony (Prebble,
1968, p. 129, for example), the two Darien expeditions seem to have been characterised
by high levels of hope—the first accounts sent home were almost lyrical in their praise
—while the failure brought despair to not only the colonists but to the nation itself.
24 The sea was not only what made the colonization possible: it also meant the arrival of
potential Indian allies, supplies, news, and reinforcements from the mother-country. As
such, it concentrated the hopes in the seedling establishment’s survival. The former’s
repeated  visits  occurred  soon  enough—Rose  and  Pennicook  report  them  in  similar
terms. The latter, in contrast, had to be long awaited: even to send Edinburgh news of
the safe arrival meant finding a ship bound for the Caribbean or, even better, Europe.
In  this  respect,  the  shipwreck  of  the  French  vessel  which  had  agreed  to  carry
dispatches, just before Christmas 1698, was a sore blow.
25 Kuna chiefs appear to have been well-pleased with their new neighbours, and Captains
Ambrosio, Pedro and Diego took turns to visit the settlers. The colonists saw them as
potential allies, inspired in this by Wafer’s account and the Kunas’ own declarations of
friendship  for  privateering  and  pirate  captains  (Rose,  2 November  1698,  p. 197).
However, as Gallup–Diaz has emphasised, the diplomacy at stake here was not one-
sided,  whatever  the  settlers  might  have  thought;  the  chiefs  had  for  long  been
negotiating alliances, with or against each other, and with or more frequently against
the Spaniards, or with buccaneers and freebooters whom they sometimes helped to
cross  the  isthmus.  Kunas,  Pocorosas,  Urabaes,  Spanish-supporting  Chocos,  all  had
agendas of their own, whereas the new arrivals failed to understand the advanced state
and complex nature of “rainforest diplomacy” (Gallup-Diaz, 2005, chapter 4).
26 Supplies were greatly needed, but few arrived. Soon after leaving Leith, Paterson was
appalled  at  the  lack  of  some  and  the  poor  quality  of  others  (“Report  by  William
Paterson”, 19 December 1699, Burton, 1849, p. 179); in Madeira, the Darien fleet bought
wine, but their autonomy in the matter of food was from the start less good than it
should have been (Prebble, 1968, pp. 118, 144). Far from trading in spices or silk, sugar
or  tobacco,  the  settlers  needed basic  provisions.  On 23 December  1698,  a  delighted
Mr Rose noted that a sloop brought “flower, beefe, & c. from Jamaica”, but it was rather
small, he noted (23 December 1698, p. 215), and, the readers may observe, quite alone.
27 Rather engagingly, echoing Wafer’s remark about a land of plenty, the secretary of the
Council  reported  good  catches,  in  keeping  with  the  motif  of  the  nurturing  sea:
“Sometimes most excellent fish taken here,  as also Tortoises (but very few yet,  not
having time nor nets fit for them,) some of them above 2, others above 300 weight: they
are the best of meat. One of them will serve 100 men of reasonable appetites.” (Rose,
p. 210, 9 December 1698) A Short Account from, and Description of  the Isthmus of  Darien, 
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Where the Scots Collony are Settled described the many resources of the place, drawing
heavily from Wafer’s account: vegetation, both useful and exotic, land animals, with a
strong emphasis on edible ones, birds, unknown, beautiful, and delicious, and fish, of
course, such as “Paracoods” (barracudas), the “Sea-Cow” (the manatee) and the best
way to catch it, for it, too, was exquisite, and turtles (1699, pp. 5–9). Yet, reading Rose’s
journal, the last impression is not quite so favourable, as the catching of fish and turtles
already seems in jeopardy due to lack of time. This may be understood as a reference to
the harsh and slow process of land clearing and building, and, implicitly perhaps, to the
high number of  sick men too,  making the progress  harder and slower.  The lack of
adequate fishing tools (Rose, 9 December 1698, p. 210) added to the difficulties of their
adaptation to their new environment, which might have been remedied had they had
time  enough  to  observe  Indian  ways  and  knowledge.  As  for  the  expected
reinforcements, the first Darien settlers never saw them: when they arrived, they found
a deserted colony, and what should have been a strengthening of the settlement proved
to be, in fact, a second attempt and a second expedition.
28 Knowing that not only allies and friends, but also spies, rivals, or enemies could come
from the sea,  Rose explains their  defensive effort:  “The Council  have ordered their
ships in a line of battle in the mouth of the harbour.” (14 December 1698, p. 213) The
need to have a clear view and anticipate an attack is evident when he adds: “There is a
look out made from which ships or vessels within 10 leagues can be descried.” (Ibid.)
Point Look-Out was indicated on contemporary maps of Darien.
29 Spies and rivals were feared, and the arrival of the English Captain Richard Long on
board his Rupert  Prize,  officially  commissioned to  sail  the  area  in  search of  sunken
treasures from wrecked ships, was interpreted as a potential threat from London, the
English capital interfering in Scottish affairs. Long was invited to dine several times
and  reciprocated  the  invitation  (Rose,  13–23 November  1698,  pp. 205–8;  Pennicook,
13-26 November 1698, pp. 88–90) and the atmosphere remained courteous throughout
his  visit,  but  as  soon  as  he  had  surreptitiously  left,  the  alarm  was  sounded:  “The
Counsell mett, where Captn Long’s sudden departure being consider’d, it was resolv’d
the Pink should  be  sent  home  to  Scotland  with  all  possible  speed”  (Pennicook,
26 November 1698, p. 90), and the anonymous diarist tartly writes that
Capt. Long came in eight days after, and I believe we were a great eyesore to him,
tho he said nothing. […] Hearing by the Natives that we were here, he came in with
his Long-boat, as he said to see us, but I believe it was only to know the certainty of
what he feared was too true. (“A Journal”, 4 November 1698, p. 77)
30 As they well knew, Captain Long was not there as a free-lance treasure-seeker, but had
been sent on some official mission: “He commanded the Rupert Prize, a small English
Man of War, fitted out by the King, upon what Design we know not, but he pretends it
was to search for a Silver Wrack […].” (Ibid.)
31 Other rivals at this time took the modest shape of a group of French privateers at the
San Blas Islands, who also benefitted from good relationships with local Indians and
their chief,  Captain Corbet (“Captain Long’s Letter”, 1699, Burton, 1849, p. 81).  They
were not necessarily hostile,  but uncomfortably close. And, centuries after the Auld
Alliance, France was known to mistrust the Scottish endeavour, fearing at first that
they would aim for their own colonial possessions instead of Darien, thus verging from
centuries  of  mutual  support,  friendliness  and goodwill,  following perhaps  the  well-
acknowledged principle “no peace beyond the line”. Furthermore, Scotland was now
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included  in  the  Union  of  Crowns,  which  made  it  part  and  parcel  of  William III’s
kingdom, Louis XIV’s Protestant enemy.
32 The enemies the New Edinburgh settlers  feared were,  of  course,  the Spaniards,  and
they waited for sometimes contradictory news about their movements from the visiting
Indian  chiefs.  The  Spaniards  could  not  admit  of  the  Scottish  intrusion  in  the
geographical centre of their empire—“the fulcrum of [their] imperial economy” (Watt,
2007, p. 5)—, which would have split the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru into two
separate  entities,  and created a  regrettable  precedent,  possibly  paving the  way for
other Protestant settlers—“Luteranos” and heretics in the eyes of Carlos II’s subjects.
Protestants or subjects of William III meant only one thing to colonial Spain, as it had
endured  repeated  attacks  from  Sir  Francis  Drake  to  Sir  Henry  Morgan  to  Captain
Bartholomew Sharp: pirates—although some of them had actually been privateers—,
that is, arch-enemies to be eradicated as soon as possible. The Council of Caledonia took
every step to reassure them on this point (“Letter by the Council of Caledonia”, Burton,
1849,  p. 91),3 but  fair  words  were  not  judged  sufficient . The  possibility  of  Spanish
reaction had been underestimated, as was their enduring strength (Storrs, 1999, pp. 6–
7, 27), by those who saw colonial Spain as an empire on the wane, inhabited by slothful,
cowardly, and degenerate individuals, and Spain itself as the very image of Carlos II, its
perpetually  ailing  monarch  whose  death  was  expected  any  minute  and  whose
succession  agitated  Europe.  But  the  counterattack  had  to  be  reckoned  with,  as
Caledonians themselves judged when they tried to take protective measures such as the
digging of a ditch and the construction of Fort Saint Andrew, overlooking the sea. “[I]f
Darien was, ultimately, a disaster for Scotland—a minor, peripheral European power—it
was a triumph for a Spanish Monarchy which remained a Great Power and was by no
means the desperate figure of legend on the eve of the advent of the Bourbons and the
War of the Spanish Succession.” (Storrs, 1999, p. 27)
33 The Company’s Directors judged, somewhat harshly, that their fellow countrymen had
under-utilised their ships in the first expedition, and thus not taken enough advantage
of the sea element:
And  whereas  we  understand  that  the  ships  sent  upon  the  first  expedition  for
settling of the said Colony were after their arrival there all along kept wholly idle
and useless, and not employed as they ought to have been in making reprisals upon
the persons and goods of the Spaniards after that they broke out in acts of hostility
against the said Colony; you are therefore hereby ordered to take care not to fall in
the  like  errour  and  neglect  […].  (“Instructions  to  Mr  Daniel  Mackay,  Captain
William Vetch, Captain Alexander Campbell of Fonab, and Mr Alexander Hamilton”,
1699, Insh, 1924, p. 189)
34 But, of course, it was easier said than done, and the second expedition did not, in the
end, fare any better than the first. Paterson saw ships as a lifeline, an indispensible link
with the outside world, and found that the Darien ships were far from meeting such
requirements:  “When we arrived first,  we were,  as  it  was,  in a Prisone for want of
sloops,  briganteens,  or  other  good,  stiff,  windwardly  vessels.”  (“Report  by  William
Paterson”, 19 December 1699, Burton, 1849, p. 181)
35 Of these ships, the Saint Andrew managed with extreme difficulty to make its way to
Port-Royal, Jamaica, after narrowly escaping wreckage off the coast of Cartagena, the 
Dolphin was taken by the Spaniards,  the Endeavour sank,  and the Unicorn had to  be
abandoned after  reaching  the  Hudson River  estuary;  the Caledonia made  it  back  to
Scotland, after staying in New York, but only just made it there from Darien (Insh, 2004,
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p. 119; Prebble, 1968, pp. 305, 178, 202, and 215). As for the second expedition, the Rising
Sun and the Hope of Bo’ness were wrecked, the Duke of Hamilton, sunk by a storm, and the 
Olive  Branch, a  supply ship which went with the Hopeful  Binning, burnt accidentally.
Despite  the  liquid  element,  wooden  ships’  greatest  enemy  was  fire  (Prebble,  1968,
pp. 306,  307,  and 237).  The aptly-named Speedy Return reached Scotland,  but was to
disappear on another, Eastern expedition with her consort the Content (Prebble, 1968,
p. 312). To describe this as a hecatomb does not seem far-fetched, and this is also meant
in human terms: “In our voyage from the Collony to New York we lost neare 150 of
about 250 persons putt on boord, most of them for want of looking after and meanes to
recover  them”—amounting  to  60%,  therefore  (“Report  by  William  Paterson”,
19 December  1699,  Burton,  1849,  p. 196).  Given  the  bedraggled  survivors’  sorry
condition, and despite the royal proclamation forbidding help to the Darien colonists,
the numerous New Yorkers of Scottish descent, as well as John Nanfan, then acting as
Deputy Governor for Lord Bellomont, tried to help them, at least to some extent (Insh,
2004, pp. 119–20). Some, however, never took to the sea again and chose to stay and
prosper in the English colonies of America instead of returning to Scotland. For them,
the sea experience was definitely over, and they had escaped a watery grave.4
36 Whilst the means to defend Darien had been chronically insufficient before the Scottish
attempt (Schurz, 1922, p. 185; Elliot, 2007, p. 59), they were increased after 1700 (Storrs,
1999).  Paterson  appears  to  have  stuck  to  his  views  of  Darien  when  he  wrote  his
“Proposal” in 1701, and in his 1704 edition of A New Description, Wafer still  urged an
English colonization of the area:  the geostrategic  charms of  the place  still  had not
faded, and were thought enticing enough to justify these publications.
37 The  Company  of  Scotland  had  lost  much,  and  so  had  the  Scottish  nation;  but  it
courageously returned to its first, Eastern interests and managed to man a few more
ships. It  did not prosper there, either. Prosperity took much longer to achieve, and
happened only after the Union (see McGilvary, 2011), which enabled Scotland to gain
access to English colonies on equal terms, although this was far from being immediate
(Clive & Bailyn, 1954, p. 201).
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NOTES
1. The late 17th-century spelling has been left unaltered, random capitalization included.
2. One notable exception to this supremacy of the sea element would seem to be Russia, then an
essentially  continental,  Eurasian  power  in  the  making,  where  colonies  came  into  direct
geographical contact with the colonial power, quite unlike the overseas territories claimed by
Western European nations. Yet, even then, the sea was not absent from the ambitions of Peter
the Great, who founded the national navy, or of Catherine II, during whose reign the search for
an  ice-free  coastline  in  winter  accounted  for  the  Russian  territorial  extension  towards  the
Crimea.
3. “Wee doe therefore, by these, signifie to you that wee are the subjects of the King of Great
Brittain, by virtue of whose power and authority granted to us, with advice and consent of his
Parliament of Scotland, wee have settled here, for the encouraging, advancing, and carying of
trade and commerce.” At this point, in Spring 1699, the Council was trying to have the men of the 
Dolphin freed from Spanish gaols, where they were detained under an accusation of piracy.
4. Among those  who chose  to  stay  was  Reverend Alexander  Stobo,  an ancestor  of  President
Theodore Roosevelt.
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ABSTRACTS
The Darien Scheme (1696–1700) appears as Scotland’s greatest attempt at colonial expansion in
its own right, before the 1707 Union of Parliaments. Due to its peninsular situation and overall
poverty, the nation had a long tradition of emigration, and by the end of the 17th century, it also
wished to take part in the trans-Atlantic venture. Far from being perceived as an obstacle, the sea
had a crucial part to play, both as a means of reaching the Americas and as a way of furthering
overseas trade.  But  enemies too could come from the sea,  and for  many of  the survivors of
Spanish retaliation and tropical fevers, the Caribbean and the Atlantic were not only a way of
escape,  but  also  a  watery  grave,  in  an  ambivalent  reversal  of  what  had  first  appeared  as  a
dazzling opportunity.
Le projet du Darien (1696-1700) apparaît comme la tentative coloniale majeure de l’Écosse en tant
que  nation  indépendante,  avant  l’Union  des  Parlements  de 1707.  Du  fait  de  sa  situation
géographique  et  économique,  elle  avait  une  longue  tradition  d’émigration,  et  souhaita
également,  à  la  fin  du XVIIe siècle,  participer  à  l’aventure  transatlantique.  Loin  d’être  perçue
comme un obstacle, la mer avait donc au contraire un rôle crucial à jouer, permettant à la fois le
passage vers les Amériques et la promotion du commerce extérieur. Mais de la mer pouvait aussi
venir l’ennemi, et pour nombre de survivants de la riposte espagnole et des fièvres tropicales, la
mer ne fut pas seulement une échappatoire, mais aussi un tombeau liquide, en un renversement
non dénué d’ambivalence.
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